Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?

This paper studies a non-cooperative bargaining problem with one buyer and many sellers, focussing on the tension between the complementarity intrinsic to such a setup and efficiency. We address this problem in a very general setup with a technology that allows for variable degrees of complementarity, a bargaining protocol that is symmetric and allows for both secret, as well as publicly observable offers, and strategies that allow for history dependence. We examine equilibria for all parameter values. Interestingly, and in contrast to most of the literature, we demonstrate that there is a large class of parameter values such that an asymptotically efficient equilibrium with a positive buyer payoff exists - thus demonstrating that strategic holdout is not a serious obstacle to the working of the Coase theorem. For robustness we examine alternative contractual forms, i.e. conditional and equity contracts, as well as variations that allow for multiple project implementation and asymmetric sellers.Multi-person bargaining, holdout, complementarity, efficiency, Coase theorem

Transparency, complementarity and holdout

This paper characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. We address this problem in a very general setup with a bargaining protocol that is symmetric and allows for both publicly observable, as well as secret offers, and a technology that allows for variable degrees of complementarity. The central insight is that the transparency of the bargaining protocol, formalized by whether offers are publicly observable or secret, as well as the extent of complementarity, play a critical role in generating efficiency. Even with perfect complementarity, holdout seems to be largely resolved whenever the bargaining protocol is public (but not if it is secret). Further, irrespective of the bargaining protocol, holdout is resolved if the marginal contribution of the last seller is not too large.Multi-person bargaining, holdout, complementarity, efficiency, secret offers, public offers, Coase theorem, transparency.

Multi-person bargaining with complementarity: Is there holdout?

This paper studies a non-cooperative bargaining problem with one buyer and many sellers, focussing on the tension between the complementarity intrinsic to such a setup and efficiency. We address this problem in a very general setup with a technology that allows for variable degrees of complementarity, a bargaining protocol that is symmetric and allows for both secret, as well as publicly observable offers, and strategies that allow for history dependence. We examine equilibria for all parameter values. Interestingly, and in contrast to most of the literature, we demonstrate that there is a large class of parameter values such that an asymptotically efficient equilibrium with a positive buyer payoff exists - thus demonstrating that strategic holdout is not a serious obstacle to the working of the Coase theorem. For robustness we examine alternative contractual forms, i.e. conditional and equity contracts, as well as variations that allow for multiple project implementation and asymmetric sellers.Multi-person bargaining, holdout, complementarity, efficiency, Coase theorem

Transparency, Complementarity and Holdout

This article characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. Our central result is that the severity of holdout (i.e. inefficiency) is critically dependent on three factors, (a) the transparency of the bargaining protocol, (b) the outside option of the buyer, and (c) the marginal contribution of the last seller. We find that although the accepted wisdom that holdout is severe, goes through whenever either the buyer has no outside option, or the bargaining protocol is secret, the holdout problem however is largely resolved whenever either the bargaining protocol is transparent and the buyer has a positive outside option, or if the marginal contribution of the last seller is not too large.Multi-person bargaining, holdout, complementarity, efficiency, secret offers, public offers, Coase theorem, transparency.

Development of classification and regression based QSAR models to predict rodent carcinogenic potency using oral slope factor

Carcinogenicity is among the toxicological endpoints posing the highest concern for human health. Oral slope factors (OSFs) are used to estimate quantitatively the carcinogenic potency or the risk associated with exposure to the chemical by oral route. Regulatory agencies in food and drug administration and environmental protection are employing quantitative structure-activity relationship (QSAR) models to fill the data gaps related with properties of chemicals affecting the environment and human health. In this background, we have developed quantitative structure-carcinogenicity regression models for rodents based on the carcinogenic potential of 70 chemicals with wide diversity of molecular structures, spanning a large number of chemical classes and biological mechanisms. All the developed models have been assessed according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles for the validation of QSAR models. We have also attempted to develop a carcinogenicity classification model based on Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). Developed regression and LDA models are rigorously validated internally as well as externally. Our in silico studies make it possible to obtain a quantitative interpretation of the structural information of carcinogenicity along with identification of the discriminant functions between lower and higher carcinogenic compounds by LDA. Pharmacological distribution diagrams (PDDs) are used as a visualizing technique for the identification and selection of chemicals with lower carcinogenicity. Constructive, informative and comparable interpretations have been observed in both cases of classification and regression based modeling.SK thanks the Department of Science and Technology, Government of India for awarding him a Senior Research fellowship under the INSPIRE scheme. KR thanks the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), New Delhi for awarding a major research project

Chemometric QSAR Modeling and In Silico Design of Antioxidant NO Donor Phenols

An acceleration of free radical formation within human system exacerbates the incidence of several life-threatening diseases. The systemic antioxidants often fall short for neutralizing the free radicals thereby demanding external antioxidant supplementation. Therein arises the need for development of new antioxidants with improved potency. In order to search for efficient antioxidant molecules, the present work deals with quantitative structure-activity relationship (QSAR) studies of a series of antioxidants belonging to the class of phenolic derivatives bearing NO donor groups. In this study, several QSAR models with appreciable statistical significance have been reported. Models were built using various chemometric tools and validated both internally and externally. These models chiefly infer that presence of substituted aromatic carbons, long chain branched substituents, an oxadiazole-N-oxide ring with an electronegative atom containing group substituted at the 5 position and high degree of methyl substitutions of the parent moiety are conducive to the antioxidant activity profile of these molecules. The novelty of this work is not only that the structural attributes of NO donor phenolic compounds required for potent antioxidant activity have been explored in this study, but new compounds with possible antioxidant activity have also been designed and their antioxidant activity has been predicted in silico

QSPR Modeling of Odor Threshold of Aliphatic Alcohols Using Extended Topochemical Atom (ETA) Indices

The present work establishes a quantitative structure-property relationship (QSPR) between top¬ochemical features and odor threshold (OT) of aliphatic alcohols. A data set of 53 aliphatic alcohols was chosen for the analysis employing different chemometric techniques, among which, genetic function ap¬proximation with spline option (GFA-spline) showed the most acceptable results in terms of internal and external validation metric values. The extended topochemical atom (ETA) indices, developed by the pre¬sent authors’ group, were considered as descriptors for model development. Additionally, selected non-ETA descriptors were also tried for model development. It was observed that the models with ETA indi¬ces significantly surpass the predictive ability of the models developed using other descriptors. The final model suggests that molecular branching and electronic parameters significantly influence the odor poten-cy of the molecules. Additionally, increased lipophilicity and reduced electronegativity increase the odor-ant property. The model thus developed may effectively be used for prediction of odor threshold of any untested aliphatic alcohols. (doi: 10.5562/cca2284

Regularising the JNW and JMN naked singularities

We extend the method of Simpson and Visser (SV) of regularising a black hole spacetime, to cases where the initial metric represents a globally naked singularity. We choose two particular geometries, the Janis-Newman-Winicour (JNW) metric representing the solution of an Einstein-scalar field system, and the Joshi-Malafarina-Narayan (JMN) metric that represents the asymptotic equilibrium configuration of a collapsing star supported by tangential pressures as the starting configuration. We illustrate several novel features for the modified versions of the JNW and JMN spacetimes. In particular, we show that, depending on the values of the parameters involved the modified JNW metric may represents either a two way traversable wormhole or it may retain the original naked singularity. On the other hand, the SV modified JMN geometry is always a wormhole. Particle motion and observational aspects of these new geometries are investigated and are shown to posses interesting features. We also study the quasinormal modes of different branches of the regularised spacetime and explore their stability properties.Comment: 22 Pages, 16 Figures. Discussions adde

Residential clustering and mobility of ethnic groups

We studied residential clustering and mobility of ethnic minorities using a theoretical framework based on null models of spatial distributions and movements of populations. Using microdata from population registers we compared the patterns of clustering amongst various socioethnic groups living in and around the capital region of Finland. Using the models we were able to connect the factors influencing intraurban migration to the spatial patterns that have been developed over time. We could also demonstrate the interrelationship of the movement and clustering with fertility. The observed clustering seems to be a combined effect of fertility and the tendency to migrate locally. The models also highlight the importance of factors like proximity to the city-centre, average neighbourhood income, and similarity of socioeconomic profiles.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figures, supporting informatio

Transparency, complementarity and holdout

This paper characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. We address this problem in a very general setup with a bargaining protocol that is symmetric and allows for both publicly observable, as well as secret offers, and a technology that allows for variable degrees of complementarity. The central insight is that the transparency of the bargaining protocol, formalized by whether offers are publicly observable or secret, as well as the extent of complementarity, play a critical role in generating efficiency. Even with perfect complementarity, holdout seems to be largely resolved whenever the bargaining protocol is public (but not if it is secret). Further, irrespective of the bargaining protocol, holdout is resolved if the marginal contribution of the last seller is not too large